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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to explain the OPEC position and the role of Saudi Arabia within 
OPEC. Saudi Arabia as the largest producer and country with largest oil reserves of oil attract 
many attention and many studies try to explain which role Saudi Arabia plays within OPEC, 
is it the role of dominant producer and which strategy Saudi Arabia used during its 
membership in order to keep its position and its market share. Saudi Arabia role is to keep the 
balance of production within OPEC. Saudi Arabia was explained as swing producer, and in 
order to protect itself and its interest because of cheating of other members of OPEC, it was 
forced to adopt the strategy tit-for-tat. There is big question of it is good to have dominant 
producer, or all of them to be equal. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is the international organization 
composed of the twelve member states. These countries mainly depend on the revenues from 
oil export.  They work together in the coordination of the overall oil price in the world 
market. OPEC is by market structure Cartel, which represents intergovernmental 
organization. As it is stated in OPEC`s Statute it is an international organization with aim to 
influence and maintain the price of oil through the control of production levels and to 
generate revenue, which goes towards meeting the development needs of its members. By 
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controlling production, by system of quotas, the OPEC has large influence on the 
determination of the price on the world market. It is hard to distinguish what is OPEC 
exactly, is it real cartel with cooperative or non-cooperating behavior. Every cartel face with 
three factors that must be accomplished in order to properly function as the cartel: 
coordination, cheating and entry. In the case for entry in OPEC case there is really high 
barriers to entry, so new producers are prevented from entrance on the oil market. Cheating is 
big problem in OPEC. Each country has incentive to cheat because the dominant strategy for 
most of the OPEC members is cheating. Each member has different needs. OPEC imposes 
production quotas to its members and meets twice a year to define their oil production 
policies. If their coordination is effective there would not be any member that violates the 
rule of quota. On the meeting the OPEC assigns the ceiling of the total output and assigns to 
each member the share that it should produce. If the member cheats the cartel should be able 
to detect and punish cheating. (Smith 2005) Aguiar-Conraria and Wen(2011) show that 
equilibrium depends crucially on the cartel`s choice of the control variable: price or quantity.  
According to the Hochman and Zilberman (2011) the OPEC is not economic but political 
cartel among big-oil exporting countries, which set fuel policy to maximize aggregate 
welfare. OPEC can be kind of the monopoly and can act as monopolist, but because there is 
some oil supply by the non-OPEC countries it is cartel. Market of the oil is not competitive, 
OPEC as a cartel fixes the output, production level, while other non- OPEC countries react to 
satisfy world demand (leader-follower game). OPEC knows how others will react so it is able 
to determine own demand and oil price so it defines its quota level to maximize own net 
revenue. It is example of Stackelberg game, where OPEC is leader and followers are Non-
OPEC producers and oil consumers. Demand for the oil of the OPEC is residual demand. 
There is still the question whether OPEC is a cartel or not. 
The work by Gulen (1996) investigates if the OPEC is cartel through causality test. Causality 
test should detect if the OPEC is able to affect prices by changing the production. Researches 
done before try to explain the OPEC as a cartel or non-cartel model.  Non –cartels models are 
focused on competition, changes in ownership and revenue target modes. Cartel models 
attempt to make the OPEC classification as the monopoly, oligopoly or dominant firm. Tests 
done in the Kaufman et al 2008, reject the hypothesis about the competitive behavior, 
changes in ownership and revenue target.  Increase in the price of oil is affect by four factors: 
capacity utilization by OPEC, production quotas established by OPEC, the degree to which 
OPEC production exceeds these quotas and private stock crude oil that are held in OPEC 
nations. It implies that OPEC through decisions about production, quotas, and operable 
capacity can influence real prices of oil. Many studies try to describe the nature of OPEC. Is 
it cartel or non-cartel market model? According to models the quotas have a statistically 
measureable effect on crude oil production in most of the countries. OPEC quota decisions 
influence the decision about price. Also it is shown that oil production by other OPEC nations 
has a measurable effect on the own production of individual member of OPEC. (Kaufman et 
al 2008)  Many factors influence the production of oil by OPEC. Those factors are mostly: 
price of oil and condition on market, the level of oil production by other producers that are 
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not members of OPEC and the geopolitical environment.  New discovered reserves of oil in 
the other countries non –OPEC members leads to the increase in the oil supply on the 
international level, with better technology and declines in the market share of OPEC.  More 
producers on the market increase the competition and brought market to more competitive 
conditions and more competitive prices, so the OPEC abandoned the administer oil pricing 
system in mid 80-s and moved to market-reference pricing based on the price quotas provided 
by oil price reporting agencies. In the OPEC interest is to adjust production quotas in order to 
achieve price target zone. Ability of OPEC to influence prices depends on the market 
participants` expectations in the future markets. In order to keep the price target range in the 
condition when the global oil demand declines, the OPEC would decrease production. These 
decisions are dependent on the coordination efforts and bargaining power of OPEC member 
countries. In the case of greater demand, OPEC would not respond immediately because of 
the large uncertainty of future demand.  Another limitation of oil production lies in the 
unfavorable geopolitical climate in OPEC member countries regarding security and there 
could be adopt the sanction that could have adverse impact on the investments and create 
limitation of expansion of capacity.  (Barros et al 2011).  
The OPEC success is based on three factors: its overwhelmingly high share in world oil 
supply, the absence of close substitutes and consequently the inelastic demand for oil, and 
inelastic non- OPEC supply. (Panayotou 1978)  
According to Bagheri 2011: In order to realize the goals OPEC does the following policy: 
The excess production capacity in major producing member countries 
The quota system by which member countries are obligated to consider the upper limits for 
their oil production. 
The OPEC use the excess production capacity to stabilize the price. 
 
2. SAUDI ARABIA ROLE IN OPEC 
As the largest world producer of oil role of Saudi Arabia in OPEC is discussed in many 
articles. Saudi Arabia acted as swing producer in 80s with adjusting output of oil in order to 
keep stable the production of oil and the price. After the persistent cheating of other 
members, Saudi Arabia was forced to adopt tit –for- tat strategy to keep its market share. 
Most stated that the Saudi Arabia is the leader in the OPEC production.  In Smith 2005 found 
indicator that Saudi Arabia may have played a special role within OPEC.  
2.1 Swing producer 
The Saudi Arabia leadership within cartel is established in order to stabilize or moderate oil 
prices and achieve its political objectives (Al Yousef 2011). The Saudi Arabia is represented 
in some studies as the swing producer or the balance wheel which absorb fluctuations in the 
supply and demand in order to maintain the monopoly price.  As is it quoted in AlYousef 
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2011, the monopoly price and the stability of OPEC depends more on whether Saudi Arabia`s 
share of the production of oil by cartel satisfies its objective than on the cohesion of the 
cartel, according to proposed model Arabia chooses the price path in order to maximize its 
wealth and taking into consideration the reactions of the other members. In order to achieve 
and keep the cartel price OPEC defines its own production level, and Saudi Arabia acts as the 
swing producer. Griffin and Teece 1982 stated that Saudi Arabia is the swing producer or the 
balancing wheel absorbing demand and supply fluctuation in order to keep stable monopoly 
price. They found that price level and level of stability in OPEC mostly depends on how 
Saudi Arabia satisfies its own needs, then on the cartel behavior. It is found that OPEC is 
choosing its production level to keep stable cartel price while Saudi Arabia acted as the swing 
producer.  Especially it is shown in period of 1975 when Saudi Arabia decreased its 
production level in order to keep stable oil price at the monopolistic level. (AlYousef,2011). 
In the case of OPEC ( Smith 2005) there is compensating behavior. One producer increase 
own production in order to offset the decline in production of others. (Smith 2005) examines 
the comparative static properties of equilibrium adjustment and he found that differences in 
the frequency of compensating the changes in the output are connected with the degree of the 
independence among the producers. This gives explanation in order to define which type of 
behavior is applied, competitive, oligopolistic or collusive behavior.  
In 1980s Saudi Arabia acts as a swing producer and Saudi Arabia adjusted its production of 
oil in order to stabilize the production of OPEC and target price. In the work of Griffin et al 
1994, the empirical results were designed to show that Saudi Arabia played the role of swing 
producer, when the profits fell below the Cournot profit floor, the swing producer strategy 
was abandoned and tit-for –tat strategy was implemented later. In the earlier ages the Saudi 
Arabia in order to stabilize prices adjust output by adopting the swing producer strategy. In 
period of 1983 to 1985 there was swing producer role assigned to Saudi Arabia and quotas to 
other members. Swing producer role is favorable if the Saudi Arabia profits more than under 
the Cournot production level. The success of this strategy depends on the willingness of other 
OPEC countries to restrict their output below Cournot level and follow quota. If others 
exceed the quotas, the Saudi Arabia decided to produce according to Cournot model in order 
to punish them. Everyone would be better off if produces within quota and Saudi Arabia acts 
as a swing producer. If others increase the production level and exceeds the quota it decrease 
revenue of Saudi Arabia and transfer it to the others and creates incentives for others to cheat 
and produce more. One of the explanation of the oil collapse in 1986  was the due to Saudi  
Arabia decision to left the role of the swing producer.  
Dahl and Yucel (1991) tested the swing producer model and that Saudi Arabia production 
level does not have any relationship with the level of output of others. Saudi Arabia is acting 
as a swing producer to prevent sharp price drops by cutting production rapidly in response to 
declining prices. 
2.2 Dominant producer 
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Smith in his work in 2008 examines: the OPEC goal is to set the price.   Kaufman et al (2008) 
results indicate that higher prices have a positive effect on production of Saudi Arabia. In 
their work Saudi Arabia did not showed the sharing behavior so it leads to conclusion that 
Saudi Arabia is a dominant firm. As it is quoted in Al- Qahtani (2008) it is found that the best 
model that explains the oil price in period 1974 to 1978 is dominant firm model. He believed 
that Saudi Arabia dominated the residual demand and through adjusting their production level 
they determine oil price on world market. Saudi Arabia has name of the dominant producer 
because of its large oil reserves and excess capacity production. 
  
Figure 1: Saudi Arabia Responses 
Griffin and Teece 1982  explains OPEC as the dominant producer with Saudi Arabia that acts 
as swing producer that is able to absorb the fluctuations in demand and supply.  As quoted 
Saudi Arabia is the swing producer or the balancing wheel absorbing demand and supply 
fluctuation in order to keep stable monopoly price. They found that price level and level of 
stability in OPEC mostly depends on how Saudi Arabia satisfies its own needs, then on the 
cartel behavior.  Saudi Arabia chose the combination which maximizes its wealth by taking 
into consideration the reaction of others. Grriffin 1994 shows that Saudi Arabia production 
depends on the production of others, with Saudi Arabia as the market leader which varies 
production inversely to the competitive output including the rest of OPEC.  
2.3 Tif – fof –Tat Strategy 
Saudi Arabia adopted the strategy tit-for-tat in order to punish cheating by other members of 
OPEC. Griffin and Neilson (1994) show in their work that in oil period of 1985 to 1986 the 
Saudi Arabia adopted tit –for –tat strategy that benefits to all members of cartels and 
established the production disciplines among them. Later Saudi Arabia was forced adopted 
tit-for tat strategy to keep its market share because of the cheating by others. Results from 
Dibooglu 2007 shows that there is significant influence of cheating in the OPEC on the real 
price of oil. Again in period 87-90 Saudi Arabia production oscillated slightly around the 
quota level and after increase in the cheating by other members Saudi Arabia in 1988 start to 
aggressively increase production and to cheat in order to match the level of the cheating by 
other members of cartel. This was the adoption of the tit-for-tat strategy because each 
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member of OPEC, including the Saudi Arabia exceeded the assigned quotas and Saudi Arabia 
kept its market share.  
The strategy adopted by OPEC should be Pareto efficiency. The Saudi Arabia adopted the tit-
for-tat strategy as long as the others production deviate from assigned quotas, and produces 
according to the Cournot best-response function for the reminder of the game if the other 
exceeds given level. All members produce according to their their Cournot best response 
functions. It is equilibrium in which Arabia plays tit-for-tat strategy and earns the profit. The 
strategy depends on behavior of others. They found that there is strong evidence that cheating 
by members of OPEC has significant influence on the real price of oil, which leads to 
conclusion that quota system is not effective. During the period of its membership Saudi 
Arabia was leader in the oil market. It has this role because of its position regarding 
production and reserves of oil. OPEC`s success was probably due to willingness of its largest 
member; Saudi Arabia, to act unilaterally to keep oil prices high. When one of the smaller 
members increased its output of oil, Saudi Arabia reduced their own in compensation. This 
was not altruism on Saudi Arabia part; rather, it arose from the logic of situation. The Saudi 
Arabia position is example of game theory model called Dominant Pig. Here Saudi Arabia is 
in the position of big pig. Both Saudi Arabia and the smaller producers knew that OPEC 
would collapse unless the Saudi Arabia limited their own production; and the smaller 
producers took advantage of this, getting a free ride on the Saudi Arabia efforts. Saudi Arabia 
captured for itself a large enough share of the benefits of the high prices that it rationally 
willing to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of maintaining the cartel. (McMillan 
1992). 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
It is hard to distinguish which kind of cartel OPEC is. As in each cartel in OPEC there is also 
cheating behavior by its members. OPEC must be able to detect and to punish cheaters. Each 
of the members are dependent on the oil production and it is in their interest to maximize 
output. OPEC is as organization as cartel, but it has almost monopoly power, because all 
other oil market participants depend on the decision of the OPEC.  
Saudi Arabia plays important role in OPEC. The role of the Saudi Arabia is to be medium 
which balance the production of the OPEC. Saudi Arabia is producer that actually influences 
the price indirectly, because if the Saudi Arabia cheats it would increase the output by whole 
OPEC and it would lead to the decrease in the price. Change in behavior of Saudi Arabia 
would shake equilibrium in the oil market, prices would decline etc. In order to prevent the 
oil shocks it would be better if the production is split among the all members, without making 
production of oil dependent on the only one producer. Position of Saudi Arabia is very 
plausible for its own interest, but if the interest of Saudi Arabia clash with interest of other 
members of OPEC it would bring negative consequences on the oil market, because Saudi 
Arabia in order to protect itself could make decision that would make all participants worse 
 3
rd 
 International Symposium on Sustainable Development, May 31 - June 01 2012, Sarajevo 
295 
 
 
 
 
 
off. It could lead to the increase in prices so it would hurt others, especially customers. Each 
member has the incentive to cheat. When one cheat, all others want the same and it leads to 
worse condition, production increased, price decline as well as there is decrease in the 
revenue. Each market should have force that will keep balance and stable equilibrium, and it 
is done by swing and dominant producer which is strong enough to provide support to others 
and brings benefits to everyone.  
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Abstract 
The notion of clusters has been attracted increasing interest from academics and business 
practitioners for two decades. The theory and research emphasize their strong and positive 
influence in promoting industrial development, innovation, and competitiveness and 
economic growth. Thus clusters, become a useful policy instrument in regional innovation 
systems (RIS) aiming to promote sustainable regional growth. Related literature suggests that 
competitive clusters provide a fertile and conducive business environment for companies to 
collaborate with research institutions, suppliers, customers and competitors located in the 
same geographical area. They are becoming powerful engines of economic development and 
drivers. Not all industries can create opportunities for employment, but of which share 
knowledge and transfer technology both directly and through upstream and downstream 
linkages with other relevant sectors. Not only they move  their production facilities, they also 
intend to transfer their research and development units from those favorable regions which 
have relatively higher stage of development than the others in terms of infrastructure 
facilities, education and training institutions, stable incentives, subsidiary potential, and the 
presence of other multinational enterprises.  
